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Petroleum activity in the East Coast of Canada is experiencing unprecedented 
regulatory uncertainty. The regulatory framework governing environmental 
assessments (“EAs”) and approvals for petroleum activities offshore the coast of 
Newfoundland and Labrador (“NL”) and Nova Scotia (“NS”) is under significant 
scrutiny and revision and the East Coast is struggling to understand new legislation 
that may have an unexpected and detrimental impact on one of the most important 
industries in both provinces, especially in NL. This uncertainty is shared with the rest 
of Canada, as all resource development industries are grappling with the potential 
implications of Bill C-69, the federal government’s overhaul and expansion of 
approval processes for development projects. However, operators in NL’s offshore are 
dealing with two other significant sources of uncertainty. The first is an expected 
regional EA process, announced by the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency 
(“CEA Agency”) in the middle of Bill C-69’s progression through the legislative 
process, by an entity which will no longer exist in name if and when Bill C-69 is 
passed. The other source of uncertainty remains the existing 2012 amendments to the 
federal EA process. While those changes were perceived generally in Canada as being 
a weakening or lessening of the rules regarding EAs, they had the opposite effect in 
the Atlantic Canadian offshore. The implications of these changes are still being 
worked through in the industry. This means the changes introduced by Bill C-69 and 
a new regional EA process will potentially be implemented in an industry already 
challenged to understand exactly what is expected of it. For an industry which operated 
from 1987 to 2012 in a relatively stable legislative environment, this rapid rate of 
regulatory change and revision is creating significant uncertainty for the industry 
participants. 
 
Legislative Issues to 2012 
 
Until 2010, federal environmental law was set out in the Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Act (1992).1 CEAA 1992 contained a number of characteristics which had 
direct implications for the NL and NS offshore areas. CEAA 1992 prescribed a strict 
legal test to determine projects that were to be captured by and required to undergo the 
federal EA process.  CEAA 1992 applied to all “federal” projects, meaning any project 
that involved the federal government as a proponent, federal lands, a federal permit, 
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or any form of federal financial assistance.2 Projects listed on the exclusion list or 
projects that were carried out in response to a national emergency were specifically 
excluded from federal EAs.3 The second characteristic important to the offshore was 
that the Canada Newfoundland & Labrador Petroleum Board (“CNLOPB”) and the 
Canada Nova Scotia Petroleum Board (“CNSOPB” and together with the CNLOPB, 
the “Boards”) were “designated authorities” for the purposes of conducting the 
required EAs for exploratory drilling and seismic activities. 
 
There was no requirement for full EAs for exploratory drilling programs; 
instead the CNLOPB, as the responsible authority, satisfied the CEAA 1992 
framework requirements. This generally resulted in an EA process for an exploration 
well that took between six and nine months. The project proponent was required to 
provide a description of the proposed physical activity with a particular emphasis on 
the existing geotechnical, shoreline, and biological environments. In coming to a 
decision, the CNLOPB considered the interaction between the project phases and the 
existing environments, while referencing the environmental factors listed in section 16 
of CEAA 1992. The CNLOPB had the authority to prescribe certain mitigation and 
monitoring procedures in light of any identified effects, project or accidental.4 
 
CEAA 2012 Amendments 
 
Starting in 2010, the then minority Conservative federal government began the process 
to amend CEAA 1992. The process was not uncontroversial. Amendments were 
included in an omnibus 2010 budget bill, thereby hindering significant detailed 
consideration of the legislation. When the mandatory seven-year review of the EA 
process was conducted by the Standing Committee on Environment and Sustainable 
Development in late-2011, the controversy continued, as the Committee terminated 
the review hearings before it heard from all interested parties. The Committee filed its 
report in early 2012. Opposition parties argued that a large number of interested parties 
did not get a chance to participate in the hearings and the Committee should therefore 
extend proceedings. The NDP and Liberal parties both filed opposition reports in early 
2012.5 Their lobbying failed and, in April 2012, in association with the 2012 Budget 
Implementation Bill, the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (2012)6 was 
introduced and passed.  
 
CEAA 2012 created a significantly different “triggering process” for EAs. 
Under CEAA 2012, the presumption is that projects are required to undergo a federal 
EA if they are a “designated project” on the Regulations Designating Physical 
 
2 Ibid, s 5. 
3 Ibid, s 7. 
4 Ibid. 
5 House of Commons, Standing Committee on Environment and Sustainable Development, Statutory 
Review of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act: Protecting the Environment, Managing our 
Resources (March 2012) (Chair: Mark Warawa) at 43, 49.  
6 SC 2012, c 19, s 52 [CEAA 2012]. 
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Activities (“Project List”).7 The Minister is responsible for creating and adding 
physical activities to the Project List.8 In the event that there is a physical activity not 
on the Project List, the Minister may use his or her discretion to require that an EA be 
completed for that project if he or she believes it could have adverse environmental 
effects.9 Once a project is either on the list or has been deemed to have potential 
“adverse environmental effects” by the Minister, the CEA Agency conducts a 
screening process. The first stage of the screening process involves the proponent of a 
project describing the designated project and the CEA Agency ultimately deciding 
whether an EA is required.10 
 
Given the process changes from the greater certainty of CEAA 1992, there 
were concerns that the new CEAA 2012 could drastically reduce the number of 
projects that were subjected to federal EAs. The concern was that the Project List itself 
could remain limited, and further to that the CEA Agency and Minister were given 
what appeared to be broad discretion to exempt both designated projects and non-
Project List projects respectively from federal EAs. Further, the CEA Agency could 
decide through the screening process that something other than a complete federal EA 
was required.11 This raised a further concern of uncertainty as to what projects would 
be subjected to EAs.  
 
It is not clear to what extent these concerns respecting the operation of CEAA 
2012 were fully realized in the rest of Canada. However, in the context of offshore 
energy projects in Atlantic Canada, the practical implications of CEAA 2012 were the 
opposite of what had been feared elsewhere. Instead of reducing the number or scope 
of EAs, the combined result of the change in responsible agency, the changes in the 
Project List, and the CEA Agency’s interpretation of the scope of CEAA 2012 has 
been to significantly change and expand the EA process in the offshore to the point 
where it is arguably inclusive and repetitive.   
 
For offshore oil and gas activities in NL and NS the Project List includes a 
significant amount of major offshore activity. Some of this is unchanged from CEAA 
1992; for example, construction, installation, and decommissioning activities at a 
project level required EAs under CEAA 1992 and were included under the Project List 
in CEAA 2012. This has not been controversial, as there is little dispute in the industry 
that major and long term project developments should undergo significant and 
thorough EAs. However, the Project List also includes the following activities: 
 
10 The drilling, testing and abandonment of offshore exploratory wells in 
the first drilling program in an area set out in one or more exploration 
licences issued in accordance with the Canada–Newfoundland and Labrador 
 
7 Ibid, s 2(1); Regulations Designating Physical Activities, SOR/2012-147 [Project List].  
8 CEAA 2012, supra note 6, s 84. 
9 Ibid, s 14(2). 
10 Ibid, ss 8, 10. 
11 Meinhard Doelle, “CEAA 2012: The End of Federal EA As We Know It?” (2010) 24 J Envtl L & Prac 1. 
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Atlantic Accord Implementation Act or the Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore 
Petroleum Resources Accord Implementation Act.12 
 
The other major change of CEAA 2012 for the NL offshore was a change in the 
responsible agency for conducting these EAs. As set out above, under CEAA 1992, 
activities in the Atlantic offshore short of development project applications that 
required federal EAs were conducted by the CNLOPB and CNSOPB in offshore NL 
and NS respectively.13 Specifically in the 1992 regime, the assessment and approval 
of activities such as exploratory drilling and seismic exploration was with the Boards, 
who were directly responsible for collecting the necessary information for EAs and 
completing the EAs.  
 
CEAA 2012 reduced the number of federal decision makers involved in 
conducting EAs across several industries, including offshore energy in the Atlantic 
Canadian region. Currently, the CEA Agency is responsible for EAs for physical 
activities included on the Project List and thus most federal EAs for major offshore oil 
and gas activities.14 The Board’s role is reduced to providing technical information 
and their expertise when required by the CEA Agency, and continuing to conduct the 
assessments for activities not included under the Project List, such as seismic testing. 
For these activities, the Boards can conduct EAs under the Accord Acts rather than 
pursuant to CEAA 2012.15 
 
In this new role, the CEA Agency interpreted “area” in section 10 of the 
Project List so as to include the area in a project proponent’s exploration licence. The 
consequence of this interpretation was a significant increase in the amount of offshore 
activity that is captured under CEAA 2012 and in the number of EAs required in the 
NL offshore, because it means the first drilling program on every exploration license 
requires a full EA. This interpretation leads to a repetitive process, as it does not 
consider whether the geographic region in which the exploration license is issued has 
been the subject of previous EAs under nearby or even adjacent exploration licenses 
or other offshore activities. As a result, license holders have been required to invest 
significant time and resources into EAs for exploration wells in areas with 
substantially the same environmental traits as areas which have been the subject of 
numerous EAs in the past.  
 
The cumulative effects of these changes were particularly noticeable for 
exploration well activity. With CEAA 2012, as a result of the Project List inclusion, 
 
12 Project List, supra note 7, s 10 [emphasis added]. 
13 CEAA 1992, supra note 1, ss 2(1), 5, 11; Federal Authorities Regulations, SOR/96-280. 
14 CEAA 2012, supra note 6, s 15(d). 
15 See CNLOPB, Development Plan Guidelines (February 2006) at s 1.3.2, online (pdf): <cnlopb.ca/wp 
content/uploads/guidelines/devplan.pdf>; Canada–Newfoundland and Labrador Atlantic Accord 
Implementation Act, SC 1987, c 3 and provincial Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Atlantic Accord 
Implementation Newfoundland and Labrador Act, RSNL 1990, c C-2 [NL Accord Acts]; Canada-Nova 
Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord Implementation Act, SC 1988, c 28 and provincial Canada-
Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord Implementation (Nova Scotia) Act, SNS 1987, c 3 [NS 
Accord Acts and, together with the NL Accord Acts, the Accord Acts]. 
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this exploration activity became subject to a full EA, and that assessment was to be 
conducted by the CEA Agency as opposed to the CNLOPB. The result has been the 
requirement for a complete EA approval process for the first exploratory well on each 
license. 
 
This has significantly extended the timelines of the process. As of March 
2019, three out of the six exploration programs currently being assessed under CEAA 
2012 submitted project descriptions in August or September of 2016 – amounting to 
over 800 days since submission. This timeline does not include the time for acceptance 
of a project description.16  This is far in excess of the six to nine months (180 to 270 
days) commonly experienced under CEAA 1992, and has created potential conflicts 
with the timelines of the underlying environmental licences described below.  
 
It is a point of some legitimate debate whether federal decision makers, like 
the Boards, or more independent regulatory bodies, like the CEA Agency, are better 
suited to conduct federal EAs. As federal decision makers like the Boards have other 
primary functions, there is an argument that adding a substantive EA process to their 
role is outside their mandate, which usually is specific to their industry, and may 
constitute a conflict of interest.17 This is the primary concern expressed with putting a 
process that considers broad environmental implications in the hands of the CNLOPB, 
a body that is mandated, in part, to “facilitate the exploration for and development of 
petroleum resources…in a manner consistent with…maximum hydrocarbon recovery 
and value; and Canada/Newfoundland and Labrador benefits.”18 The concern is that 
the CNLOPB will get “captured” by its industry and become unable to effectively 
perform its EA functions.  There has been further concern expressed that conducting 
onerous EAs, in addition to their regular duties, may stretch the resources available to 
federal decision makers. Having one agency such as the CEA Agency, some assert, 
will “bring coherence”.19   
 
Opposing arguments cite the practical advantage of having the Boards carry 
out EAs in the Atlantic offshore, an area in which the Boards possess expertise and 
already regulate.20 The CEA Agency, which needs time to get up to speed on technical 
matters and often rigorously consults the Board, can expend considerable effort to 
complete the process. The results are longer and more costly assessments. Having the 
 
16 Newfoundland and Labrador Oil & Gas Industries Association, “Submission of the Newfoundland and 
Labrador Oil & Gas Industries Association to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Environment 
and Sustainable Development regarding Bill C-69, An Act to enact the Impact Assessment Act and the 
Canadian Energy act, to amend Navigation Protection Act and to make consequential amendments to other 
Acts (Undated) online (pdf): 
<noia.ca/Portals/0/Communications/General%20and%20Mics/House%20of%20Commons%20on%20Bill
%20C-69%20Final%20Submission%20-%20180406.pdf > [NOIA Submissions]. 
17 “Environmental Groups Perplexed Over Possible Offshore Assessment Changes”, CBC News (24 January 
2018), online: <cbc.ca/news>. 
18 “Mandate”, online: C-NLOPB <cnlopb.ca/about/mandate/>. 
19 House of Commons Debates, 42-1, Vol 148, No 267 (27 February 2018). 
20 Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers, “Bill C-69 Impact Assessment” (October 2018), online: 
<capp.ca> [Bill C-69 Assessment].  
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Boards, which generally have existing working relationships with the project 
proponents, conduct the EAs themselves may cut down on the time the EAs take and 
reduce the ultimate cost to the taxpayer and the project proponent. Project proponents 
have publicly stated that timelines have expanded since the Board was removed as the 
“responsible authority” for EAs.21 The Boards, proponents lobby, conduct EAs more 
efficiently due to their expertise, experience in, and deep knowledge of the Atlantic 
offshore industry. Some say overlooking that expertise in the context of EAs would be 
detrimental to the offshore industry in terms of exploration, development, safety, and 
the environment.22  
 
Industry members have explicitly lobbied for the removal of exploratory 
wells from the Project List.23  They assert that EAs for this activity are more 
appropriately conducted under the Accord Acts (the potential for which is discussed 
in more detail below). The CNLOPB has expertise in this field as it has completed a 
significant number of EAs on numerous exploration programs in the past. Further, 
industry highlights that exploratory drilling is a temporary activity; the drilling period 
for an exploration well is typically 60-90 days of activity, after which the well is 
capped and abandoned. However, CEAA 2012 requires the same EA for exploration 
wells as permanent activities that do not have the same environmental impact, such as 
pipeline projects or nuclear energy projects.24 
 
There is evidence that the issues noted above were acknowledged by the 
federal government. In 2015 the Conservative government tried to expand the Boards’ 
involvement under CEAA 2012 by developing regulations to significantly add to their 
authority. The rationale was cited as “…to reduce duplication and streamline the 
regulatory process for offshore oil and gas projects”.25 The Harper government 
ultimately abandoned the regulations and the Trudeau administration did not pursue 
the matter any further.  
 
CEAA 2012 also changed how EAs are conducted. CEAA 1992 had various 
options for levels of EAs including screening, comprehensive studies, mediation, and 
panel reviews.26 These options could occur independently or in certain circumstances 
in addition to one another. The 2012 CEAA has two potential options for how an EA 
is conducted: the standard EA or a panel review.27  
 
 
21 Terry Roberts, “Proposal to Retool Environmental Assessments Rattling Nerves in Newfoundland’s 
Offshore” CBC News (19 June 2017), online: <cbc.ca/news>.  
22 NOIA Submissions, supra note 16. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid.  
25 “Federal Authority as a Responsible Authority for Designated Projects Regulations: Regulatory Impact 
Analysis Statement” (27 June 2015) 149:26 Can Gaz. 
26 CEAA 1992, supra note 1, ss 14–45. 
27 CEAA 2012, supra note 6, ss 15–65. 
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Under CEAA 2012 the Minister has the discretion to refer EAs to the review 
panel after considering a list of certain factors. For offshore projects in NL and NS, 
there is no requirement in CEAA 2012 that any member of the panel review be a 
member of either Board. This represented a further departure from the Boards’ 
involvement with the process.  
 
Project proponents in the offshore and elsewhere have shown consistent 
frustration with the uncertainty and complexity of CEAA 2012’s standard EA process. 
The process has been described as “long, drawn-out uncertain regulatory and judicial 
processes” that ultimately places an unreasonable cost on the proponents and 
governments involved.28 As noted by Canada’s Oil & Natural Gas Producers in their 
submission to the House of Commons Standing Committee, “[a] 2016 WorleyParsons 
Canada study of [EA] practices worldwide observed that, while Canada has an EA 
process that is one of the most thorough and comprehensive, it also “currently has one 
of the most expensive, time and resources consuming EA processes in the world.””29   
 
The Effects on Licensing 
 
The CEAA 2012 changes came at the same time as an unprecedented increase in 
exploration drilling activity offshore NL. Since 2014, significant exploration licensing 
rounds have resulted in 22 new exploration licenses being issued by the CNLOPB and 
$3,381,016,331 of committed exploration activity. This represents a doubling of 
exploration expenditure commitments over the pre-2014 total from all previously 
licensing rounds since 1988.30  
 
The new exploration licenses issued as a result of this activity have terms and 
requirements fixed by the Accord Acts. Exploration licenses are issued subject to nine-
year terms that are divided into two “Periods”. Period I is six years (which can be 
extended for three additional one year periods by posting escalating drilling deposits 
which are refundable if a validation well is drilled during the applicable extension 
period).  Failure to drill a well during Period I results in the termination of the 
exploration at the end of Period I and Period II is not commenced. Where a well has 
been drilled, Period II runs for the remaining term of the license.  These timeframes 
have not changed since 1987.  
 
Before CEAA 2012, the environmental approval process through the 
CNLOPB for exploratory drilling was not an issue – while the process could take 9 
months, it was a known timeframe that fit easily within the six-year Period I drilling 
requirement. However, the new EA process, taking in excess of 24 months, causes 
significant pressures in a context where exploration activity cannot easily occur year 
 
28 Bill C-69 Assessment, supra note 20. 
29 Canada’s Oil & Natural Gas Producers, “Submission of Canada’s Oil and Gas Producers to the House of 
Commons Standing Committee on Environment and Sustainable Development on Bill C-69 An Act to enact 
the Impact Assessment Act and the Canadian Energy Regulator Act, to amend the Navigation Protection 
Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts” (6 April 2018) [CAPP Submissions].  
30 CNLOPB, “Call for Bids Chronology”, online (pdf): <cnlopb.ca/wp-content/uploads/bidchron.pdf>. 
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round and the CNLOPB has no discretion to extend or vary the statutorily-mandated 
license timeframes. 
 
In other words, interest in exploration in NL has accelerated at the same time 
the environmental approval requirements for such activity has fundamentally changed, 
but the timeframes for the underlying activities and rights have not been adjusted to 
compensate for lengthy environmental review. This has resulted in a time crunch 
which complicates exploration, by compressing the timeframes for activities, and 
reduces the flexibility and margins of error for other aspects of the activities besides 
EAs. In the extreme, a license holder could be unable to drill and subjected to the 
forfeiture of its security deposits to the Federal government, notwithstanding that the 
regulatory processes imposed by the Federal government contributed to the license 
holder’s default in its obligation to drill. This situation could certainly have a 
detrimental impact on industry participants and is unfortunately a real possibility that 
license holders could face. Despite this, there is no indication that either the province 
or the Federal government have a plan to address this circumstance.   
 
Project proponents have indicated that reducing unnecessary regulatory 
burden and duplication and introducing clear, predictable legislation will encourage 
global exploration investment.31 
 
Bill C-69 – The Future? 
 
On February 8, 2018, the Government of Canada introduced Bill C-69, the full title of 
which is “An Act to enact the Impact Assessment Act and the Canadian Energy 
Regulator Act, to amend the Navigation Protection Act and to make consequential 
amendments to other Acts”. Catherine McKenna, the Minister of Environment and 
Climate Change, described it to her fellow parliamentarians as follows:  
 
I have two words to describe what we announced today: better rules. We 
understand that we need to have a process to review major projects that is 
based on good science and indigenous traditional knowledge, that we need 
to be consulting with Canadians, that we need to be working in partnership 
with indigenous peoples, and that we need good projects to be able to go 
ahead in a timely fashion. That is exactly what we announced today.32 
 
Bill C-69 is an enormous legislative undertaking. It will continue the CEA Agency as 
the Impact Assessment Agency (the “IAA”), and transition the National Energy Board 
to the Canadian Energy Regulator. While the scope and mandate of these organizations 
will expand, they are not being dissolved. In fact, it appears functionally not much 
within the new Agency will change.33 The sitting President and Vice President of the 
former CEA Agency before the continuation will continue in those offices at the 
 
31 NOIA Submissions, supra note 16; CAPP Submissions, supra note 29.  
32 House of Commons Debates, 42-1, Vol 148, No 260 (8 February 2018). 
33 Bill C-69, An Act to Enact the Impact Assessment Act and the Canadian Energy Regulator Act, to Amend 
the Navigation Protection Act and to Make Consequential Amendments to other Acts, 1st Sess, 42nd Parl, 
2018 [Bill C-69], s 153(1), “Transitional Provisions”. 
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IAA.34 Bill C-69 also doesn’t affect the employment status of any current CEA Agency 
employees.35 Further, any legal contract, agreement or document to which the former 
CEA Agency was a party shall equally bind the new IAA.36 Although the processes 
for EAs may change, the resources used to conduct them will largely remain the same, 
for now.  
 
The Bill will expand what was previously an EA into an Impact Assessment 
(“IA”), adding a number of new criteria that will have to be considered. These include 
cumulative effects, project need, contributions to sustainability, traditional Indigenous 
knowledge, biodiversity, climate change impacts, and the intersection of sex and 
gender.37 
 
This list of factors, along with the “public interest factors” the Impact Agency 
must consider,38 are broadly worded and address a host of social topics, but fail to 
address relevant economic factors. The IAA is not required to explicitly consider 
certain potential economic benefits the activity might bring, such as employment to 
the region in which the project is located. Industry participants argue the Bill would 
benefit from the explicit inclusion of such economic factors, including the provision 
of all necessary infrastructures.39 
 
While Bill C-69 reduces the statutory timeframes which the IAA will have to 
complete its work from the legislative timeframes for the CEA Agency in CEAA 2012, 
it is more selective as to when those clocks start running, providing that time spent by 
proponents answering questions in the process will not count. Further, the timelines 
exclude a new pre-assessment or “screening” stage that proponents argue will help 
streamline the assessment process once initiated. Rather, it prescribes a 180-day 
timeline for the IAA to make a decision during the “Planning Phase”.40 Proponents 
have expressed concern at this length of time. 180 days represents over three times the 
number of days that CEAA 2012 provides for the project description and initial 
determination of the CEA.41 Proponents are also concerned about the vagueness of the 
180-day period, namely the lack of milestones built in to the legislation.42 As per 
section 14(1) of Bill C-69, proponents may not be provided with a summary of the 
IAA’s issues with the project until the end of the 180-day period.43 Further, the 180-
 
34 Ibid, ss 169, 170. 
35 Ibid, s 171. 
36 Ibid, s 172. 
37 Ibid, s 22(1). 
38 Ibid, s 63. 
39 CAPP Submissions, supra note 29, s 13. 
40 Bill C-69, supra note 33, ss 10–15. 
41 NOIA Submissions, supra note 16. 
42 CAPP Submissions, supra note 29, s 2. 
43 Bill C-69, supra note 33, s 14. 
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day period is a significant commitment to a project proponent who may find out at the 
end of the timeline that it is not required to conduct an IA.  
 
To provide clarity and efficiency for proponents, industry has submitted that 
Bill C-69 should be amended to require that the IAA provide (i) the summary of issues 
and (ii) the final decision as to whether an IA is required at shorter timeframes than 
the full 180 days.44 Without a further explanation of what the IAA is supposed to be 
doing during the timeframe, the 180-day time period overall appears unnecessarily 
long and there is significant industry support for it being shortened.  
 
Bill C-69 has been controversial since its introduction; it is not universally 
agreed whether Bill C-69, if enacted as currently drafted, will actually be a step 
towards the worthwhile objectives described above by Minister McKenna. While the 
federal government has made amendments to Bill C-69 in an attempt to provide greater 
certainty and predictability for corporate proponents,45 critics of Bill C-69 say, even 
as currently drafted, it will make the project assessment process in Canada less certain 
and more political and discretionary than is the case today.46 The Fraser Institute, 
which is one of the most vocal opponents of Bill C-69, points to the following three 
issues in support of its opposition:47 
 
1. The pre-planning phase, which occurs before the IAA has to “start the clock” 
on the statutorily imposed timelines, creates new opportunities for project 
opponents to create delay;48 
2. Removal of the “standing” requirement for public participation: now any 
person or group wishing to be heard will be permitted to participate, 
regardless of where they are located or what, if anything, their connections to 
the project or region are;49 and  
3. Despite repeated references to science-based decision-making, the 
requirement to consider traditional indigenous knowledge and the 
“intersection of sex and gender with other identity factors” during project 
assessment.50  
 
While each of those issues, and how they will actually be interpreted and applied by 
the IAA, are on the radar of those engaged in the offshore industry on Canada’s east 
 
44 CAPP Submissions, supra note 29, s 2. 
45 Government of Canada, “Key Amendments to Bill C-69 and Bill-68” (June 2018), online: 
<canada.ca/en/services/environment/conservation/assessments/environmental-reviews/bill-c-69.html >. 
46 Bruce Pardy, “Federal Reforms and the Empty Shell of Environmental Assessment” (31 May 2018), 
online: Fraser Institute <fraserinstitute.org/studies/federal-reforms-and-the-empty-shell-of-environmental-
assessment>.  
47 Kenneth Green, “Trudeau Sticking with Bill C-69” (16 November 2018), online (blog): Fraser Forum: 
The Fraser Institute Blog <fraserinstitute.org/blogs/trudeau-sticking-with-bill-c-69>. 
48 Bill C-69, supra note 33, ss 10–20.  
49 Ibid, ss 11, 27, 33(1)(e), 51(1)(c), 99. 
50 Ibid, s 22(1). 
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coast, there are also other specific concerns. The primary one is the uncertainty that 
remains with respect to both the requirement for an impact assessment, and the impact 
assessment process itself, with respect to exploration drilling programs.51 This 
ambiguity has been further compounded by the delayed release of any draft regulations 
for the Impact Assessment Act, especially the highly anticipated updates to the 
“Designated Project List”.   
 
It is this potential for conflict between federal EA requirements and the 
Atlantic Accords, including the statutory requirements under the Accord Acts, which 
made NL’s offshore oil and gas industry particularly sensitive to the changes created 
by CEAA 2012. The same is true of the intended reforms should Bill C-69 be enacted. 
These concerns extend beyond the specifics of the assessment processes, to the entire 
joint management regime for the offshore that underpins the Accords. These concerns 
with respect to the Atlantic Accord’s relationship to Bill C-69 have been raised in the 
Senate, where a robust debate of Bill C-69 occurred throughout the Fall of 2018. 
Senator Denise Batters, who represents Saskatchewan, rose in the Senate on December 
12, 2018 to say: 
 
Another problem with Bill C-69 is that it undermines the joint management 
principles of the Atlantic Accord Acts. The Governments of Canada and 
Newfoundland and Labrador jointly manage the Canada-Newfoundland and 
Labrador Offshore Area through the Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador 
Offshore Petroleum Board. As currently written, the Impact Assessment Act 
gives the federal minister and cabinet the power to pause, suspend or cancel 
a project, potentially overriding the terms of the accord. This discretionary 
power creates the potential for further politicization of the process and 
increases uncertainty for project proponents. 
 
The concerns about Bill C-69 are not only that the new legislation fails to improve 
upon the problems created by CEAA 2012 for offshore development; there is 
significant concern new legislation may also make it worse.  For instance, under 
CEAA 2012, the CNLOPB remained responsible for EAs for seismic programs as well 
as other offshore activities which are not included within the Project List. The 
CNLOPB’s timeline for completion of an EA process is 19 weeks, substantially less 
than that under either CEAA 2012 or Bill C-69. However, there is increasing concern 
that, not only will exploratory drilling programs remain subject to federal impact 
assessments under Bill C-69, but that geophysical activities like seismic and other 
routine offshore activities may get caught within the expanded impact assessment 
requirements as well. 
 
During Bill C-69’s second reading in the Senate, there was at least some 
indication that “exploration, geophysical activities, like seismic, and expansions to 
existing offshore projects” may be excluded from federal impact assessments under 
Bill C-69.52 On December 7, 2018, Senator Grant Mitchell, in response to a question 
by Senator David Wells on such activities, suggested that while the composition of the 
 
51 CAPP Submissions, supra note 29; NOIA Submissions, supra note 16.  
52 Debates of the Senate, 42-1, Vol 150, No 226 (18 September 2018). 
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designated project list was still an open process, perhaps such routine activities would 
be left off the designated project list by saying: 
 
[…] a couple of factors will mitigate your concern. The IAA will 
have a limited budget. The CER will have a limited budget. The 
board you were on will have a limited budget. There will be lots of 
pressure not only to go off and do every possible project in an 
extensive review, and there will be a settling process. In fact, that’s 
one of the things that will occur in a preplanning process. 
 
However, many projects will never go that route. They won’t be 
designated projects under the project list; they won’t be major 
projects. That principle will hold firm. So it’s very unlikely, I 
would say — but we’ll see what the regulations say — that the 
kinds of projects that you’re mentioning — which is a very good 
point — will not be subjected to major project review under the 
IAA or under the joint or integrated process. In fact, if it’s 
relatively small, it will be done specifically by the offshore board 
through what is called a regulatory process and not the designated 
project process.53 
 
Notwithstanding this statement, the composition of the Project List is still an open 
process, and lobbying efforts for it to be both more and less inclusive in respect of 
offshore activities continue. 
 
Finally, proponents take issue with the preclusion of Atlantic offshore 
projects from substituted processes. The new Impact Assessment Act gives the 
Minister discretion in some instances to defer to the environmental assessment process 
of other jurisdictions, rather than requiring a full federal impact assessment. However, 
Bill C-69 states that the Minister must not approve the substitution of a process in 
relation to a designated project that includes activities regulated under the Accord 
Acts.54 In fact, under the new legislation,55 the Minister must refer offshore projects in 
NS and NL to review panels. The industry in NL argues that by never allowing the 
Minister to defer environmental assessments for offshore projects to the CNLOPB, the 
new act fails to utilize the expertise of the CNLOPB in handling exploratory 
development and offshore health and safety matters. Participants believe these 
provisions of Bill C-69 should be deleted.56 However, review panels under the Impact 
Assessment Act do look to employ the Board’s expertise to some degree. At least two 
members of the review panel must be chosen from a roster established on 
recommendation from the Chairperson of the Board in NL and NS.57 
 
53 Ibid [emphasis added].  
54 Bill C-69, supra note 33, s 32(b). 
55 Ibid, s 43 and “Amendments to the Impact Assessment Act”, supra note 33, s 5.  
56 NOIA Submissions, supra note 16. 
57 Bill C-69, supra note 33 at “Amendments to the Impact Assessment Act”, ss 6–7.  
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Regional Assessment  
 
Further muddying the waters, but potentially providing a solution that may completely 
or partially satisfy the requirement for an EA with respect to each individual drilling 
program,58 is the announcement of an Agreement to Conduct a Regional Assessment 
of Offshore Oil and Gas Exploratory Drilling East of Newfoundland and Labrador 
between Canada and Newfoundland and Labrador (the “Regional Assessment 
Agreement”).59 
 
The Regional Assessment Agreement contemplates the appointment of a 
Committee that will: 
 
conduct a Regional Assessment of offshore oil and gas exploratory 
drilling east of Newfoundland and Labrador […] On completion of 
the Regional Assessment, the Committee will provide the Ministers 
with a Report which includes the Committee’s advice on how to best 
use the results in a systematic way to aid decision-making based on 
geographically-referenced knowledge and clear criteria. As such it 
will meet or exceed the rigour and performance of the current 
environmental assessment and regulatory review process used for 
the approval of exploratory drilling.60  
 
The Committee is established by the federal Minister of the Environment pursuant to 
the CEAA 2012, which allows the Minister to establish a committee to conduct a study 
of the effects of existing or future physical activities carried out in a region that is 
entirely on federal lands.61 If the region in question consists of some or no federal 
lands, the Minister may enter into an agreement with any federal authority (i.e. the 
CNLOPB) respecting the joint establishment of a committee to conduct the study.62 
The Committee is granted the same powers as a review panel under the CEAA 2012, 
namely the ability to summon witnesses to give evidence or produce records and to 
hold public hearings.63 The Committee is required to consider the factors listed in 
 
58 CAPP Submissions, supra note 29. 
59 Agreement to Conduct a Regional Assessment of Offshore Oil and Gas Exploratory Drilling East of 
Newfoundland and Labrador Between Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada as Represented by the 
Federal Minister of the Environment and the Federal Minister of Natural Resources and Her Majesty the 
Queen in Right of the Province of Newfoundland and Labrador, as Represented by the Provincial Minister 
of Natural Resources and the Provincial Minister Responsible for Intergovernmental Affairs and Indigenous 
Affairs [Regional Assessment Agreement] at Appendix D – “Terms of Reference – Committee”, s 1.1. 
60 Ibid at Appendix A, s 1.1. 
61 CEAA 2012, supra note 6, s 73. 
62 Ibid, s 74. 
63 Ibid, ss 77, 45. 
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Appendix A to the Regional Assessment Agreement64, and must furnish a report to the 
Minister upon completion of the study.65 
 
The stated purpose of the Regional Assessment Agreement includes creating 
a more efficient EA process while maintaining the highest standards of environmental 
protection.66 
 
The Regional Assessment Agreement, if intended to serve as a 
comprehensive and anticipatory EA process for its Proposed Regional Assessment 
Study Area (described in Appendix ‘B’ – “Proposed Regional Assessment Study 
Area” therein), is an initiative that project proponents may see as a step in the right 
direction towards a less onerous and costly EA process. It represents a coordinated 
effort to improve the efficiency of the regulatory process given the Province’s recently 
announced goal of having 100 new exploratory wells drilled by the year 2030.  
 
Importantly, the Regional Assessment Agreement states that “[s]hould 
CEAA 2012 be repealed and replaced by new legislation, this agreement remains valid 
with any necessary modifications” and that “[t]he agreement has been designed to 
meet the requirements of CEAA 2012 as well as those of the proposed Impact 
Assessment Act.”67 This anticipates the passing of Bill C-69 and the replacement of 
CEAA 2012 with the new Impact Assessment Act. In the event Bill C-69 is passed, 
the Regional Assessment Agreement will not require significant revisions. Like CEAA 
2012, Bill C-69 allows for the joint establishment of a Committee with a federal 
authority “to conduct a regional assessment of the effects of existing or future physical 
activities carried out in a region”. However, Bill C-69 contemplates the possibility of 
the IAA, rather than the Minister, being in charge of establishing the Committee.68 The 
factors to be considered by the Committee listed in Appendix ‘A’ of the Regional 
Assessment already mirror the listed factors in Bill C-69 more closely than they do the 
factors of CEAA 2012. The public (and particularly Indigenous) consultation 
requirements placed on the Committee are more onerous in Bill C-69 than in CEAA 
2012, but that onus is somewhat addressed in the Draft Regional Assessment 
Agreement itself.69 The Committee must also explicitly consider “scientific 
information”.70 Bill C-69 also allows a Committee to conduct “strategic assessments”, 
which may assess “any issue that is relevant to conducting impact assessments of 
 
64 Regional Assessment Agreement, supra note 59 at Appendix A. 
65 CEAA 2012, supra note 6, s 75. 
66 Government of Canada, Regional Assessment of Offshore Oil and Gas Exploratory Drilling East of 
Newfoundland and Labrador, online: <ceaa-acee.gc.ca/050/evaluations/proj/80156?culture=en-CA>. 
67 Regional Assessment Agreement, supra note 59, ss 1.2–1.3. 
68 Bill C-69, supra note 33, s 92. 
69 Ibid, ss 97(2), 98, 99, 102(1). 
70 Ibid, s 97(2). 
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designated projects or of a class of designated projects”. A strategic assessment could 
also potentially tackle the issues surrounding exploration wells.71     
 
While it is encouraging that the Regional Assessment Agreement 
contemplates its continued validity under a new Impact Assessment Act, some have 
raised concerns about how well the current draft of Bill C-69 addresses the actual 
process of strategic and regional assessments.72 It is also unclear what triggers a 
strategic or regional assessment aside from the Minister’s discretion. Further, is it also 
unclear what the effect of a completed regional or strategic assessment will be.  
 
We submit that Bill C-69 would benefit from a more detailed description of 
what each assessment entails, and what factors the Minister must consider in deciding 
whether or not an issue is referred to an assessment Committee. CAPP suggests that a 
list of completed assessments should be maintained and used as a part of the exclusion 
criteria on the designated project list to reduce duplication of efforts.73 At a minimum, 
the Act should explicitly address what effect a completed regional or strategic 
assessment has on the IAA when it is deciding what projects move forward to full IAs. 
It should also be noted that there are no specific requirements for the appointment of 
regional or strategic assessment Committee members.74 Industry suggests that Bill C-
69 should be amended to include more detail on the composition of the Committee, 
especially in the situation of a joint assessment Committee with a federal authority, 
and should consider requiring a minimum percentage of the Committee to be 
comprised of members of that federal authority to properly utilize their expertise.   
 
Further, it remains unclear what the relationship between the regional 
assessments completed pursuant to the Regional Assessment Agreement will be with 
impact assessments required under the Impact Assessment Act. At least three 
possibilities exist: 
 
1. Exploratory Drilling will be included on the Designated Project List and an 
approved regional assessment will eliminate the need for impact assessments 
for individual exploratory drilling programs under the Impact Assessment 
Act if conducted in accordance with the approved regional assessment; 
2. Exploratory Drilling will not be included on the Designated Project List and 
the regional assessment will serve as a discretionary assessment process for 
all exploratory drilling within the Proposed Regional Assessment Study Area; 
or 
3. Exploratory Drilling will be included on the Designated Project List and 
individual exploratory drilling programs will be subject to review under the 
Impact Assessment Act, with the regional assessment only removing the 
 
71 Ibid, s 95(b). 
72 NOIA Submissions, supra note 16. 
73 CAPP Submissions, supra note 29. 
74 Bill C-69, supra note 33, s 96(1). 
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requirement for consideration of “cumulative impacts” within the impact 
assessments process. 
 
The most likely outcome is the first possibility noted above, that the regional 
assessment will remove the need for individual assessments for each drilling 
campaign. However, until the proposed regional assessment is complete and its 
application to the industry known, operators will likely initiate or continue their own 
individual assessments under either CEAA 2012, or the Impact Assessment Act (if 
enacted), to remain in closer control of their own regulatory timelines. 
Notwithstanding that the Regional Assessment Agreement states that “[t]he 
Committee will submit its Report to the Ministers no later than fall, 2019”, such a 
timeline appears completely unrealistic. The Regional Assessment Agreement was 
only signed in mid-April of this year. Twenty-three groups submitted comments on 
the Draft of the Regional Assessment Agreement, many with substantive concerns or 
recommendations that largely do not appear to have been addressed by the Agreement. 
These groups included operators, indigenous communities throughout eastern Canada, 
industry associations, environmental non-governmental organizations, and individual 
citizens. Cumulatively, what these responses illustrated was that the regional 
assessment process, if initiated, will be keenly attended and likely attract a wider group 
of participants than all prior EAs for individual drilling programs.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Bill C-69’s stated purpose is an attempt by the federal government to relieve some of 
the existing uncertainty and lack of predictability faced by proponents across a range 
of resource development industries across Canada, including petroleum activities in 
the Atlantic offshore. Although CEAA 2012 was seen by some as a de-regulation of 
the EA process by the Harper Government, project proponents in the Atlantic offshore 
have voiced their concern that the legislation had a contrasting, and possibly 
unintended effect. Federal EAs are currently expensive and onerous, and their bloated 
timelines are difficult to reconcile with existing licensing regulations for the 
exploration of the offshore.  
 
As industry members wait out the potential effect of Bill C-69, the EA 
landscape appears more uncertain than ever. The Regional Assessment Agreement 
may prove to be a solution to the problems identified by proponents, but it currently 
adds to the existing uncertainty. The offshore industry is unclear how the Agreement 
will interact with Bill C-69 if and when it is passed. Add to that the fact that the new 
project list regulations for Bill C-69 have not yet been published, and offshore 
operators find themselves trying to try to understand the way in which a new regulatory 
regime is going to affect their industry before they had a chance to fully digest the 
existing regime. Industry participants are continuing to lobby for the more predictable 
and stable EA process that existed prior to 2012, even with all its flaws. Although it is 
difficult to determine at this stage whether their voices will be heard, if history is 
anything to go by, it appears unlikely.   
